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INTRODUCTION 
Popping your favorite band’s new disc in a work computer can result in 
security compromise of your employer’s computer network. Playing this 
disc in your home computer can result in your identity being stolen 
through financial data stored on your machine’s hard drive and your 
machine becoming a remotely controlled spam zombie.1 Consumers worry 
 
 
 1. Zombie drones are security compromised machines that can be controlled remotely without 
the user’s knowledge for sending spam or other malicious purposes. See, e.g., Locking Your Cyber 
Front Door—The Challenges Facing Home Users and Small Businesses: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, 108th 
Cong. 84 (2004) (statement of Thomas M. Dailey, Chair and President U.S. Internet Service Providers 
Association, General Counsel, Verizon Online), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/ 
10jan20051230/www.access.gpo.gv/congress/house/pdf/108hrg/96994.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); 
Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23 (2006); Primer: Zombie Drone, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2004, at F3. 
 Purchasing spam time on a zombie drone is also relatively inexpensive, costing as little as three to 
ten cents per host machine per week. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Penetrating the Zombie 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/2
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about identity theft and express growing concern over information 
security,2 yet they do not connect these concerns with their daily 
technology behaviors. Consumers appear to be regularly “consenting” to 
serious security risks, such as possible remote compromise of their 
machines, when they use everyday products with digital rights 
management technologies, or DRM. This contradiction in consumer 
behavior poses a critical question for the law: Is there a set of legal 
problems that contribute to this information security consent paradox? The 
answer is a resounding yes.  
In the name of defending intellectual property, DRM now frequently 
engages in behaviors that, on their face, appear identical to hacking 
behaviors.3 Many producers of digital products use DRM. In particular, 
digital music is being protected by the recording industry through security-
invasive DRM that hides from users, cannot be easily uninstalled, 
compromises the security of user machines, stealthily reports on user 
behaviors, and permanently disables certain functions on the computers of 
users.4 The determination of whether these DRM risks are known to 
consumers and are legally acceptable, as well as whether the DRM 
behaviors constitute hacking or permissible intellectual protection, turns 
solely on the question of whether a user consents. Therefore, digital 
“consent” now pushes together at least three bodies of law: intellectual 
property law, computer intrusion law, and contract law. Part of this 
information security paradox of consumer “consent” results from labels 
for doctrinal concepts in law crossing legal disciplines. The resulting 
 
 
Collective: Spam as an International Security Issue, 3 SCRIPT-ed 370, 373 n.12 (Dec. 2006), 
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/matwyshyn.asp. See also Posting of Can 
Read Me to Sun-breaks (Feb. 4, 2005, 11:05 EST), http://sunbreaks.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_ 
archive.html.  
 2. See, e.g., Juan Carlos Perez, Security Concerns to Stunt E-Commerce Growth (June 24, 
2005), http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/24/HNsecurityconcerns_1.html.  
 3. Several recent DRM products have included features that monitor and remotely report user 
behaviors in the name of intellectual property protection. These products can install remotely 
executable code, change settings on user machines, hide themselves within other programs, lack a 
means of uninstallation, expose the user to security threats from malicious third parties by creating 
vulnerabilities on the user’s machine, and communicate personal user information from the user’s 
computer to the content owner. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, Security Firm: Sony CDs Secretly Install 
Spyware, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2005, at D1, available at http://www.boston.com/business/ 
technology/articles/2005/11/08/security_firm_sony_cds_secretly_install_spyware/. 
 4. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html.  
 Part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has advised consumers not to install software 
from an audio CD. See Press Release, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, First 4 Internet 
XCP (Sony DRM) Vulnerabilities (Jan. 2, 2006), http://www.us-cert.gov/current/archieve/2006/01/02/ 
archive.html [hereinafter US-CERT]. 
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“noise” from this accidental merger must be quickly addressed; this noise 
is a harbinger of an imminent large-scale security compromise of networks 
in the name of intellectual property protection.5 In social systems, finding 
this type of legal noise triggers a need for review; sometimes, we need to 
prod our system toward developing into a more socially optimal regime.6 
Security-invasive DRM has revealed the need to doctrinally nudge 
“consent.”  
This Article proposes to ease doctrinal noise in consent through 
creating an objective “reasonable digital consumer” standard based on 
empirical testing of real consumers. In a manner similar to the way in 
which courts assess actual consumer confusion in trademark law, digital 
user agreements can be tested for legal usability. Specifically, a particular 
digital agreement would be deemed to withstand an unconscionability 
challenge only to the extent that a drafter can demonstrate a “reasonable 
digital consumer” is capable of meaningfully understanding its terms and 
presentation.  
This proposal of an empirically generated reasonable digital consumer 
standard harnesses the dynamics of three separate types of code—
computer code,7 legal code,8 and organizational code.9 As Larry Lessig 
has articulated, computer code can act as a powerful form of regulation by 
transmitting the values of its creators, allowing legal code to then 
comment on computer code to exert a second regulatory force.10 Lessig’s 
framework can be expanded to include a third type of regulation—
organizational code that arises from dynamic interactions. This regulation 
emerges11 from the behavioral strategic norms of various actors, including 
end users in the aggregate, entities doing business, and the technology 
 
 
 5. Despite the urgency of the current information security situation, noise is not inherently bad. 
In fact, a small amount of noise in a system can result in more optimal functionality in the long term. 
See, e.g., P.L. Mazzeo, M. Nitti, E. Stella, & A. Distante, Visual Recognition of Noisy Fastening Bolts 
Using Neural Networks and Wavelet Transform, in IASTED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: 
VISUALIZATION, IMAGING, AND IMAGE PROCESSING 452-050, 566 (Sept. 6–8, 2004), available at 
http://www.actapress.com/PaperInfo.aspx?PaperID=18813.  
 6. Noise in law is a signal to examine doctrinal emergence and, perhaps, to modify our legal 
constructs in a more adaptive manner. 
 7. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 53 (1999).  
 8. Id. 
 9. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach to 
Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 499 (2004). 
 10. LESSIG, supra note 7. 
 11. Emergence is order that arises from the interactions of individual actors within a complex 
system, demonstrating a global pattern that could not have been forecast simply from understanding 
the behavior of one particular actor. See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES 
OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES AND SOFTWARE 18 (2001).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/2
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transactions bar. These forces shape and reshape the comparative power 
and legal strategies in response to changes in the system. Examining these 
three types of code and their regulation of digital “consent,” this Article 
uses the case study of security-invasive DRM12 to introduce the benefits of 
the reasonable digital consumer standard. 
Part I of this Article introduces the challenges computer code presents 
to consent in the intellectual property space using the example of security-
invasive DRM. It briefly describes DRM as a common business strategy 
for preemptively enforcing intellectual property rights. It then explains the 
negative consequences of this strategy for the information security of 
businesses, governments, and consumers. One of these negative 
consequences is industry confusion regarding the ethical norms of 
acceptable technology business conduct. 
Part II examines legal code and consent, placing the norm confusion 
described in Part I in legal context. This section describes the strain that 
the emergence of security-invasive DRM has placed on copyright law, 
computer intrusion law, and contract law in the United States. This tension 
forces us to come to terms with the preexisting problems of contractual 
consent and form contracts in a digital context. Current doctrinal 
construction of digital consent has analyzed user agreements only on 
grounds related to procedural unconscionability. This approach is flawed 
as a matter of contract doctrine: procedural and substantive 
unconscionability must be analyzed simultaneously under either 
Williston’s13 or Corbin’s14 standard of unconscionability. Either of these 
two approaches would correctly assess as unconscionable many current 
user agreements.  
Finally, Part III discusses the organizational code emerging at the 
intersection of computer code and legal code in digital contracting. It 
posits one possible legal approach to reconstructing meaningful consent in 
digital contracts in order to solve the problems of unconscionability 
discussed in Part II—generating an empirical objective “reasonable digital 
consumer” standard by looking to trademark law. Trademark case law 
offers well-established methods for determining whether a “reasonable” 
consumer is confused by a particular trademark or practice; these cases 
 
 
 12. For purposes of this Article, I define security-invasive DRM to refer to any DRM that 
changes user settings, disables functionality of the user’s PC, and/or does not arrive with an uninstall 
capability, thereby exposing the user to additional security risks in the name of protecting digital 
content. 
 13. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1972). 
 14. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1993). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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employ empirical testing by experts using real consumers. Importing this 
“legal usability testing” into digital contracting would benefit both users 
and content owners through creating predictability of legal outcome. 
Similarly, a reasonable digital consumer standard leverages the naturally 
occurring “hubs” of understanding that both courts and content owners 
seek to generate through form contracts. The proposed method strikes a 
successful balance between customization and standardization by using 
the real understandings of users. It also allows for evolution of these 
understandings over time as users’ familiarity with technology, and 
technology itself, advances. 
I. COMPUTER CODE: DMCA, EMERGENCE OF SECURITY-INVASIVE DRM, 
AND DRM’S NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
The intersection of intellectual property, computer intrusion, and 
contract law has been a heated topic of legal discussion since at least the 
middle of the 1990s15 and the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).16 The DMCA was watershed legislation: it limited the rights 
of users to take apart digital products they purchased and codified the right 
of content owners to engage in technological self-help against would-be 
copyright infringers.17 Consequently, some content owners have adopted 
progressively more aggressive intellectual property strategies through 
digital means, using contract law as a backstop. A vivid case study of this 
dynamic is the latest iteration of DRM,18 security-invasive DRM that 
frequently monitors and technologically restricts the behaviors of content 
users.19 Emboldened by anti-circumvention restrictions of the DMCA, 
 
 
 15. One early hot-button issue at the intersection of intellectual property and data security was 
the so called “Clipper Chip.” The clipper chip was a cryptographic device which allegedly provided 
the ability to protect private communications while at the same time permitting government agents to 
use the “keys” to unscramble communications upon presenting cause. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier 
Foundation Archive, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Key_escrow/Clipper_III/ (last visited May 3, 2006). 
 16. The DMCA amended the Copyright Act and was signed into law on October 28, 1998 as the 
United States’ implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright 
Treaty. However, the United States implemented the treaty in a manner that expanded copyright 
owners’ protection more than the approaches of other countries. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 (1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/ 
dmca.pdf. 
 17. In the perception of the content owners DRM is a permissible self-help mechanism. In the 
perception of opponents to DRM, it is an illegitimate enclosure of digital commons. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 175–60 (2004). 
 18. For a discussion of legal implications of DRM, see, e.g., Dan L. Burke, Legal and Technical 
Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005).  
 19. As used herein, “users” include consumers, businesses, and governments using the content 
protected by DRM.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/2
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DRM technologies have become progressively more invasive to the point 
where their conduct is, on its face, indistinguishable from criminal 
computer intrusion. The critical legal difference, it is frequently argued, is 
the user’s contractual consent to the form contracts that, at least in theory, 
authorize the conduct.20 This consent is usually manifested by the user,21 
with the click of a mouse, ostensibly saying “yes” to a contract that likely 
cannot be understood by many users and usually goes unread.22 
Meanwhile, this “consent,” in theory, indicates the user’s agreement to 
technological conduct23 that might otherwise be considered hacking. The 
practice of relying on security-invasive DRM in lieu of subsequent legal 
action may make sense in the eyes of the companies engaging in it; it 
appears to be more cost effective to add a few hundred lines of code to a 
digital product on the front end than it is to pay several lawyers for 
hundreds of hours to litigate later. However, from a technology policy 
perspective this proactive content enforcement strategy is problematic. 
Apart from further straining the legitimacy of the regime created by the 
DMCA, these technologies also compromise information security. This 
compromise involves not only the security of the particular user machines 
the DRM inhabits, but the security of the entire information economy.24 
Consequently, a conflict in business norms has arisen regarding the ethical 
and legal permissibility of this conduct. This conflict reflects a belief held 
by parts of the technological community that users are not meaningfully 
“consenting” to security-invasive DRM. Put another way, they believe that 
users are putting themselves unknowingly at risk, installing products 
whose functionality and possible harms they do not understand and blindly 
clicking “yes” to every agreement before them.25  
 
 
 20. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity, 8 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 515, 523 (2007). 
 21. A manifestation of consent presumes the consumer is capable of finding the contract and is 
able to review it. Convention has arisen in the online world that user agreements are not necessarily 
presented in plain sight, frequently lurking at the bottom of websites in small font that is not 
necessarily readily visible to users. Some user agreements are not provided on website homepages. 
See, e.g., Google, http://www.google.com (last visited May 13, 2006), for an example of a website 
with a user agreement that is not visible from a homepage.  
 22. Users are frequently unable to read the license before proceeding with starting up a computer 
because no printed copy of the license is included. Users almost invariably click on “Accept” without 
reading the license. See, e.g., Andrew Jankowitch, EULAw: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-
Making in Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 5 (2006). 
 23. Security-invasive DRM has been labeled “spyware” in some contexts. See infra note 49.  
 24. See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 25. See, e.g., Posting of Fred Von Lohmann to Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2005/11/now-legalese-rootkit-sony-bmgs-eula (Nov. 9, 2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Emergence of DRM as a Common Intellectual Property Management 
Strategy 
Technical control measures limiting copying and use of software have 
been commonplace since the 1980s. However, during the 1990s, as music 
and movie content began to be distributed primarily through digital copies, 
content owners began to feel a sense of urgency for generating effective 
technological controls on the copying and use of content. Technological 
advances, particularly readily available high-speed internet access, 
changed the business landscape. Businesses began to view DRM as a 
necessary method of limiting content piracy, ensuring that only paying 
customers could benefit from their digital products.26  
Proponents of any form of DRM point to widespread content piracy 
throughout the world27 and the inadequacy of law in policing it. They 
assert digital self-help through DRM is their best hope to protect content 
from piracy.28 Meanwhile, opponents of DRM have long argued against it 
on the principle that technology should be unfettered and that the 
affirmative defense of fair use prevents recovery of damages in many 
claims of copyright infringement asserted by content owners.29 Similarly, 
opponents have pointed to technological disadvantages that DRM can 
bring, such as limiting functionality of applications, shortening battery 
life,30 crippling the development of future computing architecture,31 and 
now, perhaps most seriously, possible security compromise of user 
machines, allowing attackers, for example, to remotely take control of 
users’ machines. Similarly, black markets for exploit code breaking DRM 
are emerging; in other words, code to circumvent DRM has acquired 
monetary value as a black market commodity.32  
 
 
 26. See, e.g., Recording Industry of America Association, Piracy: Online and On the Street, 
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 27. For example, it is estimated that over ninety percent of software in Vietnam consists of 
pirated copies and twenty-two percent of software in the United States is pirated. See, e.g., 
NationMaster, Crime Statistics, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/cri_sof_pir_rat (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2006).  
 28. See, e.g., Andrew Orlovsky, Mickey Mouse Blesses Microsoft DRM, THE REGISTER, Feb. 10, 
2004, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/02/10/mickey_mouse_blesses_microsoft_drm/. 
 29. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Digital Rights Management and Copy Protection 
Schemes, http://www.eff.org/issues/drm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 30. Peter Laborge, DRM Cuts Battery Life Short, SECURITYFOCUS, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www. 
securityfocus.com/brief/166. 
 31. For a discussion of the systemic limitations DRM may impose on innovation and open 
architectures, see, e.g., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, PROTECTING COPYRIGHT AND 
INTERNET VALUES (2005), http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20050607framing.pdf. 
 32. For a discussion of the relationship between technology black markets and intellectual 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/2
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The mainstreaming of the internet and ease of digital file transfer has 
further catalyzed content owners’ efforts to create “unbreakable” digital 
content protection mechanisms. Consequently, several prominent 
technological failures of DRM have occurred, including one DRM scheme 
that was easily broken simply by writing along the circumference of a CD 
with a permanent marker.33 Against this technological backdrop, the 
DMCA34 came into effect as the legal redundancy35 to the technological 
copying restrictions of DRM. The DMCA prohibited, among other acts, 
circumvention of DRM.36 As the DMCA debate continued in the legal 
community, prosecutions under it began. For example, in one (in)famous 
case, a Russian national was arrested at a technology security conference 
in Las Vegas in 1999 for posting code on the internet that broke a DRM 
scheme.37  
These DMCA prosecutions attest that the technological knowledge to 
break DRM encryption schemes is likely to be possessed by many people 
 
 
property, see, e.g., Annalee Newitz, The High Tech Black Market, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 
2003, available at http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/17424/. 
 33. Team Register, Christian Rockers Risk Wrath of DMCA with DRM Tips, THE REGISTER, 
Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/21/christian_rockers_drm_tips/. 
 34. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2000). 
 35. In computer terminology, redundancy means having additional duplicate components to 
improve the functionality of systems or as backup in case the initial component fails. See Institute for 
Telecommunications Science, http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-030/_4477.htm (last visited May 
1, 2006). 
 36. For a discussion of the DMCA and DRM, see, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights 
Management in the United States and in Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004) (arguing statutory 
limitations to the different means of DRM protection seem necessary); Burke, supra note 18 
(examining social costs of deploying digital rights management systems to protect copyrighted 
content); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003) (arguing that with 
some adjustments, DRM technologies could be harnessed to protect privacy); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, 
Digital Rights Management: Many Technical Controls on Digital Content Distribution Can Create a 
Surveillance Society, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing DRM could lead to a 
“surveillance” society and proposing eight policy principles to extend privacy protection to the 
distribution of digital media); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating 
Fair Use from DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005) (setting forth a 
new administrative complaint procedure and suggesting that the nature and scope of the fair use 
doctrine needs to be more fully developed for the doctrine to be a meaningful part of copyright law in 
the digital age); Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 501 (2003) (arguing that encryption researchers should be able to conduct and publish 
certain types of research without significant fear of liability under the DMCA); Declan McCullagh & 
Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Relating to Digital Rights 
Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 317 (surveying both the pro-
DRM and anti-DRM remedies and arguing that both camps are mistaken and Congress should remain 
neutral and refrain from setting industrial policy); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 1107 (2005) (arguing that the DMCA might, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
actually limit the development and deployment of DRM in the field of copyrighted goods).  
 37. For a list of DMCA prosecutions, see, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Recent EFF 
Legal Cases and Efforts, http://www.eff.org/legal/recent_legal.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
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apart from the creators of the DRM in question. Workarounds remind 
content owners that users of their content would not necessarily idly 
accept DRM; until DRM runs on tamper-resistant hardware,38 digital 
content will remain vulnerable to copying by technologically adept, 
determined users. Thus, undoubtedly in frustration at the arms race 
between authors and breakers of DRM, content owners and DRM authors 
have started to resort to copyright protections in DRM that attempt to 
leverage security through obscurity39: in the words of one content owner, 
“[i]f consumers even know there’s a DRM, what it is, and how it works, 
we’ve already failed.”40  
It comes as no surprise that the newest wave of DRM tries to hide itself 
and uses coding techniques that have traditionally been the domain of 
hackers. New variants of DRM trigger the urgent need to reconfigure the 
balance among copyright protection, consumer protection, and contractual 
consent.  
B. Negative Consequences of Security-Invasive DRM for Information 
Security 
While hacking was usually associated with users attempting to 
circumvent DRM technologies, in the last year the tables have turned. 
DRM schemes have themselves begun to use the tactics of hackers and 
malware authors.41 These new breeds of DRM intend not only to prevent 
users from disabling the DRM but, more ominously, to prevent users from 
even knowing that the DRM has been installed and is operating in the 
background on their machines.42 In just the last year, over 500,000 
systems across 135 countries have been made vulnerable to remote 
 
 
 38. See Spencer Chang, Paul Litva & Alec Main, Trusting DRM Software (W3C Workshop on 
ORM, 2001), http://www.w3.org/2000/12/drm-ws/pp/cloakware.html. 
 39. “Security through obscurity” is the idea that adequate security should be driven by the 
subjective beliefs of the owners of a system regarding the security of that system. Therefore, if the 
owners believe that particular security flaws of the system are not widely known or inconsequential, 
then it must be the case that attackers are unlikely to find and exploit them as long as the owners keep 
information about the vulnerabilities secret. “Security through obscurity” is discredited in the tech 
community. See, e.g., University of California at Irvine, The Swirl Project: Effective Security Through 
Visualization, http://www.isr.vic.edu/projects/swirl/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).  
 40. Science Fiction?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 62 (quoting Peter Lee, executive at 
Disney), available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4342418 (by 
subscription). 
 41. Two sets of Sony DRM were implicated: XCP and SunnComm’s Media Max version 5. See, 
e.g., Brian Krebs, Study of Sony Anti-Piracy Software Triggers Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/02/AR2005110202362.html.  
 42. See, e.g., Science Fiction?, supra note 40.  
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compromise due to DRM that behaves like malicious code.43 This means 
that remote attackers can readily access, examine, damage, and take 
control of the computers on these systems via the internet. Such systems 
have included systems within the military and government, including the 
U.S. Department of Defense.44 
Specifically, several recent DRM products have included features that 
monitor and remotely report user behaviors in the name of intellectual 
property protection. These products can install remotely executable code, 
change settings on user machines, hide themselves within other programs, 
lack a means of uninstallation, expose the user to security threats from 
malicious third parties by creating vulnerabilities on the user’s machine, 
and communicate personal user information from the user’s computer to 
the content owner.45 Even as the companies using these stealth DRM 
tactics released uninstallers, they have frequently been unapologetic for 
the security-invasive DRM itself;46 they signal an unwillingness to give up 
security-invasive DRM as an intellectual property strategy. In at least one 
case, after the DRM’s methodology was made known to the public, the 
company responsible for it provided an uninstaller that itself further 
compromised user machines47 and allowed remote third parties to take 
control of the machines where the uninstaller had been used, turning them 
into “bots.”48 Once machines become bots, they can be stealthily 
 
 
 43. Over 200,000 copies of the program are installed on computers in Japan, 130,000 in the 
United States, 44,000 in the United Kingdom, 27,000 copies in the Netherlands and Spain, and 
between 8,000 and 12,000 in each of Korea, Peru, France, Australia, and Switzerland. See, e.g., Paul F. 
Roberts, Sony’s ‘Rootkit’ Is on 500,000 Systems, Expert Says, EWEEK, Nov. 15, 2005, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1887181,00.asp?kc=EWRSS03119TX1K0000594. 
 44. Schneier, supra note 4; US-CERT, supra note 4. See also supra note 1. 
 45. Bray, supra note 3. 
 46. “‘Most people, I think, don’t even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?’ 
the head of Sony BMG’s global digital business, Thomas Hesse, told National Public Radio.” Brian 
Bergstein, Copy Protection Still a Work in Progress, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2005, 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051118/ap_on_hi_te/music_copy_protection.  
 47. Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker,  http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/ 
?p=931 (Nov. 17, 2005, 13:46 EST).  
 48. Uninstallers to the Sony DRM allowed remote third parties to take control of PCs where the 
uninstaller was used. Id. Meanwhile, virus writers produced a Trojan which took advantage of the 
Sony-BMG rootkit and users who clicked on an alleged photograph in an e-mail installed malicious 
software which then connected to the Internet Relay Chat chat network and opened a channel to 
control the infected computer. John Borland, ‘Bots’ for Sony CD Software Spotted Online, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Nov. 10, 2005, http://news.com.com/Bots+for+Sony+CD+software+spotted+online/2100-
1029_3-5944643.html; Tom Espiner, Trojan Horses Targeting Sony DRM Rootkit Found, ZDNET UK, 
Nov. 10, 2005, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39236720,00.htm; John Leyden, 
First Trojan Using Sony DRM Spotted, THE REGISTER, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2005/11/10/sony_drm_trojan/. 
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harnessed into networks for attacking other machines. Thus, the costs of 
security-invasive DRM go beyond an individual user’s machine.  
Meanwhile other technology companies have classified this type of 
DRM as “spyware,” an information-collection application that is not 
consensually installed by a user.49 Some companies have even released 
their own uninstallation tools for removing the offending code, not trusting 
the authors of the security-invasive DRM to fix the problems they have 
caused.50 Consumer groups have filed multiple lawsuits and state attorney 
generals have initiated several actions resulting from at least one such 
DRM incident.51 
These technology-driven dynamics demonstrate two business trends 
that impact construction of digital consent. First, the rise of security-
invasive DRM points to progressive technological similarity of tactics 
used by legitimate business and criminal computer code authors. Just as 
information criminals surreptitiously push code to monitor user conduct 
onto user machines, security-invasive DRM can submit an unwitting 
consumer to hidden monitoring, in some instances prior to presenting the 
user with a User Agreement.52  
Second, the technology business community lacks a consensus about 
acceptable conduct and about the role of User Agreements. The companies 
that have classified security-invasive DRM as spyware and released 
removal tools are either explicitly or implicitly condemning invasive DRM 
as a violation of ethical business conduct. Similarly, their actions question 
the practical impact of User Agreements, suggesting that had their users 
understood the implications of the DRM, they would not have consented 
to its installation. Software that exploits this informational disadvantage 
commonly goes by another name: “spyware.”53  
 
 
 49. Microsoft classified Sony BMG’s DRM as spyware and provided an uninstallation tool. See, 
e.g., Microsoft to Remove BMG Code, BBC NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
technology/4434852.stm. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Class action suits were filed against Sony BMG in New York and California. The Texas 
Attorney General also brought legal action against Sony BMG. New York and Sony reached a 
tentative settlement. See, e.g., Associated Press, Sony BMG Tentatively Settles Suits On Spyware, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2005, at C4, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res= 
F20C10F938540C738FDDAB0994DD404482; Sony Sued Over Copy-Protected CDs, BBC NEWS, 
Nov. 10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4424254.stm. 
 52. The XCP software was installed before the User Agreement appeared, and the User 
Agreement does not mention the XCP software explicitly. See, e.g., Posting of Mark Russinovich to 
Sysinternals, http://blogs. technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-
rights-management-gone-too-far.aspz (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 PST). 
 53. For example, if a content provider asks “do you want to play this CD?” without clearly 
explaining that certain PC functionality will be permanently disabled as a consequence, is this 
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These two technology trends demonstrate that noise54 exists in the 
business community about the role and operational incorporation of digital 
consent. Just as Congress struggles with generating clear legal standards 
for delineating what behaviors make a piece of code illegal, the technology 
community is struggling with the extent of necessary disclosure about 
code’s behavior to users. This set of evolving standards becomes 
complicated further when layered onto preexisting tensions in copyright 
law, computer intrusion law, and contract law.  
II. LEGAL CODE: CURRENT DOCTRINAL TENSIONS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW, COMPUTER INTRUSION LAW, AND CONTRACT LAW 
As explained above, noise exists in the technology community 
regarding ethical lines of disclosure, conduct, and obtaining meaningful 
user consent. Similarly, noise exists in the way the law is attempting to 
define digital consent at the intersection of multiple bodies of law, 
rekindling traditional debates about consent to form contracts with new 
complications. Due to technologies such as security-invasive DRM and 
the contracts that accompany them, doctrinal legal tensions are straining 
three bodies of U.S. law in particular—copyright law, computer intrusion 
law, and contract law.  
Part of law’s contribution to this information security paradox of 
consumer “consent” results from labels for doctrinal concepts in law 
crossing legal disciplines. Unlike the labels, conceptual meanings are 
frequently generated independently by legal disciplines and developed by 
different legal actors in an uncoordinated manner. Eventually these 
compartmentalized legal regimes bump into each other, and “noise” occurs 
in our system. Noise currently exists in intellectual property and 
technology regulation doctrine in the way law defines consent. This 
doctrinal tension has become painfully visible because of recent 
developments in DRM. The legal line between permissible copyright self-
defense on the one hand and computer intrusion on the other turns solely 
on users’ digital consent. This doctrinal noise forces us to address the 
 
 
qualitatively different from a phishing e-mail? When a phishing e-mail arrives in a user’s inbox asking 
“do you want us to reset your password?” and the user clicks yes, they are “consenting” to their 
information being shared with the fraudster. It can be argued that these two types of consent situations 
are not materially different; in both the user is not clear on the long-run consequences of consent. 
 54. The term “noise” refers to any disturbance tending to interfere with the normal operation of a 
device or system. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/ 
dictionary/noise (last visited May 2, 2006). 
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preexisting problems relating to contractual consent and form agreements 
or contracts of adhesion in a digital context. 
A. Copyright Law, Theory, and Preemptive Self-Defense 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”55 Under this power, Congress has enacted copyright 
legislation, in particular the Copyright Act56 as amended by the DMCA.57 
Although the Copyright Act entitles the owner of a copyright to the 
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, display, perform, and license the 
copyrighted work,58 section 107 of the Copyright Act places a limit on this 
“exclusive right” through an exception for certain uses.59 This gives rise to 
the idea that certain types of “fair use” exist that allow a person to copy 
material she has purchased within the parameters provided by the 
Copyright Act.60 Copyright holders frequently view their protections more 
expansively than users,61 and correspondingly argue for aggressive 
interpretations of what it means to commit piracy.62 The DMCA fueled 
 
 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2000).  
 57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2000).  
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 59. These uses include such acts that relate to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research. Id. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
 61. See, e.g., RIAA, http://www.riaa.org (last visited May 23, 2006).  
 62. For a discussion of the evolving role of intellectual property rights in the digital age, see, e.g., 
Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005). See also, e.g., 
Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 469 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) 
Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8, available at 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Symposia/Privacy/99_VS_81; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US 
Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 11 (2005); Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On 
Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 223 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2005); Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 1 
(2004); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free Software and the Death of 
Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REV. 1 (2004); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of 
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998); Pamela 
Samuelson, Toward a “New Deal” for Copyright in the Information Age, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1488 
(2002); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); Sara K. 
Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006); Eugene Volokh, In 
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this perception further. Specifically, the DMCA contains, among other 
things, an anti-circumvention provision that criminalizes circumvention of 
“a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under [the DMCA]” as well as “manufactur[ing], import[ing], 
offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or otherwise traffic[king] in any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof . . . for the 
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under [the DMCA].”63 However, from the plain 
language of the statute, Congress did not intend the DMCA protections for 
technological self-help measures to be absolute and included exceptions in 
the statute covering security research and spyware.64  
Though perceived by some as providing the necessary legal support for 
content protection and an arguable extension of copyright law, others view 
the DMCA and its anti-circumvention provisions in particular as crossing 
the line into curtailing conduct previously defensible under fair use.65 Let 
 
 
Closing, The Trojan Doctrine: Trademarks and the Law of the Horse, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 259 
(2003); R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 423 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 
(2004); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1; 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Daddy, Are We There Yet? Lost in Grokster-Land, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 75 (2005); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary 
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(2) (2000). 
 64. The language of the DMCA withdraws liability for circumventing DRM in certain instances: 
Protection of Personally Identifying Information.  
(1) Circumvention permitted.—Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is 
not a violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title, if—(A) the technological 
measure, or the work it protects, contains the capability of collecting or disseminating 
personally identifying information reflecting the online activities of a natural person who 
seeks to gain access to the work protected; (B) in the normal course of its operation, the 
technological measure, or the work it protects, collects or disseminates personally identifying 
information about the person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, without 
providing conspicuous notice of such collection or dissemination to such person, and without 
providing such person with the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or 
dissemination; (C) the act of circumvention has the sole effect of identifying and disabling the 
capability described in subparagraph (A), and has no other effect on the ability of any person 
to gain access to any work; and (D) the act of circumvention is carried out solely for the 
purpose of preventing the collection or dissemination of personally identifying information 
about a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, and is not in violation 
of any other law.  
(2) Inapplicability to certain technological measures.—This subsection does not apply to a 
technological measure, or a work it protects, that does not collect or disseminate personally 
identifying information and that is disclosed to a user as not having or using such capability. 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(i). 
 65. For a discussion of how opponents of DRM believe it to be encroaching on fair use, see, e.g., 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 29.  
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us assume that a reasonable argument could be made in favor of non-
invasive DRM using the historical justifications for copyright. In other 
words, let us presume for the moment that technological self-defense of 
intellectual property promotes economic and social welfare in the 
aggregate, defends the moral right of an author in the fruits of her labor, 
and furthers creators’ self-realization by limiting others’ uses of the 
intellectual property to those explicitly allowed by the author. However, 
even if one is to assume that these justifications have merit in the context 
of non-security-invasive DRM, they falter in the case of security-invasive 
DRM.  
Security-invasive DRM fails to strike a balance between the rights of 
an author and the good of innovation generally; through security-invasive 
DRM one content owner potentially limits the ability of users to consume 
other authors’ work or to generate independent digital work. On a large 
scale, an information economy composed of users with security 
compromised, crippled machines due to invasive DRM benefits no one. 
Innovation is stifled, and security threats include identity theft, fraud, and 
compromised machines being harnessed for denial of service66 and other 
attacks. As such, neither economic efficiency nor self-realization of 
content creators is maximized when DRM crosses into the realm of 
security-invasiveness.  
The DMCA exception relating to impermissible spyware has received 
little attention to date but is perhaps most on point when considering 
issues of security-invasive DRM. The DMCA exempts from the definition 
of a prohibited circumvention the act of disabling DRM that collects 
personally identifiable information about a user.67 This exception 
implicates other bodies of law through notions of contractual consent: the 
framing of the exception relies on lack of “conspicuous notice” to the 
user.68 However, the exception is written narrowly, allowing disabling of 
the DRM only if the sole effect of the disabling pertains to the data 
collection features, does not provide any additional access to the work, and 
only to the extent that the DRM was without “conspicuous notice of . . . 
collection or dissemination [of personally identifiable information], and 
 
 
 66. A denial of service attack is a type of attack where a malicious user, process, or system 
attempts to prevent legitimate users from accessing a network resource by exploiting a weakness in a 
system through, e.g., flooding network connections, filling disk storage, disabling ports, or removing 
power. For a discussion of service provider liability and denial of service attacks, see, e.g., Doug 
Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
221 (2006). 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i). 
 68. Id. 
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without providing [the user] with the capability to prevent or restrict such 
collection or dissemination.”69 In essence, though, if DRM behaves in a 
manner described by this preceding provision without consent, it may fit 
both the statutory definition of spyware in many states’ anti-spyware 
statutes70 and, in some cases, will likely qualify as a criminal and civil 
computer intrusion. Thus, the determinative fact is whether a user 
meaningfully consented.71  
B. Computer Intrusion Law and Theory 
Just as in tort and criminal law generally, what constitutes an intrusion 
or an unwanted technological “touching” of a user’s machine is contingent 
entirely on user consent. The language used by computer intrusion statutes 
revolves around “interception,” i.e., monitoring without consent, and 
“exceeding authorized access,” meaning surpassing the extent of 
consent.72 Two federal statutes, as well as a patchwork of state statutes, 
use this framework of consent in the context of criminal and civil 
computer intrusion—the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA)73 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).74 DRM and 
 
 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i)(1)(B). 
 70. Definitions of spyware vary across legislation. For a discussion of spyware legislative efforts, 
see, e.g., California Goes After Spyware, WIRED, Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/politics/ 
0,1283,65203,00.html. Spyware can be embedded as part of other products installed by the user. As 
such, it can bury itself into users’ hard drives in a manner which makes it difficult to ferret out and 
uninstall. These programs then convey information back to their author. See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, 
Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1345 (2005). 
 71. For examples of state anti-spyware statutes see,, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.792, 
45.45.794, 45.45.798 (Supp. 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7301–7304 (Supp. 2007); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-111-101–105 (Supp. 2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 
Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-150–157 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.8-1-1–24.4.8-3-2 
(West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715.1–715.8 (West Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-H1–
H6 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001–48.102 (Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 13-40-101–401 (Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (2004 & Supp. 2006); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.270.010–900 (West 2007). 
 72. See supra notes 69, 70. 
 73. The ECPA is composed of Title I, amendments to the Wiretap and Title II, the Stored 
Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2710 (2000). Generally, 
the Wiretap Act prohibits interception of communications, including those in transient storage. 
“Except as otherwise specifically provided in” the Act, “electronic communication[s],” which are 
defined expansively, may not be “intercepted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). An exception is provided for 
electronic communication service providers, but it only applies to “activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of [the] service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of 
that service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).  
 The Stored Communications Act restricts accessing communications that reside in a particular 
system. The Patriot Act clarified at least one existing possible ambiguity in the language of the Stored 
Communications Act by explicitly including voicemail messages under its coverage. Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
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other technology that collects data about users’ behaviors without explicit 
user consent may be engaging in acts that are prohibited under both the the 
ECPA and the CFAA. Consequently, a finding of a legal circumvention 
under the DMCA can be construed to simultaneously mean a violation of 
the ECPA or the CFAA.  
For example, the ECPA has been applied to business conduct, most 
recently to e-mail providers who have read and copied contents of user e-
mails to their business advantage, exceeding the expectations of users 
created by the operative User Agreement.75 Similarly, section 1030 of the 
CFAA is usually associated with criminal prosecution of hacking offenses. 
However, the civil and criminal offense arising out of “unauthorized 
access” to computer systems as well as the “transmission” of harmful 
 
 
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The Stored 
Communications Act’s main criminal provision reads as follows:  
(a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever—(1) intentionally 
accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service 
is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby 
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is 
in electronic storage in such system shall be punished.  
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).  
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000). The Stored Communications Act’s contains an explicit 
“provider” exception: “Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to conduct 
authorized—(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service.” 
§ 2701(c). It has been argued that § 2701(c)(1) establishes almost complete immunity for a service 
provider that “obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to” e-mail that is “in electronic storage” in 
its system. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e read 
§ 2701(c) literally to except from Title II’s protection all searches by communications service 
providers.”). A second provision of the Stored Communications Act prohibits “a person or entity 
providing an electronic communication service to the public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any 
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). This provision also has service provider exceptions, permitting a provider to give 
access to an electronic communication “to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are 
used to forward such communication to its destination,” or “as may be necessarily incident to the 
rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.” 
§§ 2702(b)(4), (5). Some confusion exists regarding the interaction of the two statutes and certain 
potential definitional ambiguities. Most recently the interaction of the two parts of the ECPA was 
discussed in United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 75. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 70. Bradford Councilman was a bookseller who provided a free 
e-mail service to his customers. Councilman directed his employees to intercept and copy all incoming 
communications to their customers from Amazon.com. The system administrator modified the server’s 
procmail recipe to copy the message and place the copy in a separate mailbox that Councilman could 
access prior to customers’ receiving the e-mails for the purpose of gaining competitive advantage over 
Amazon.com. The appeals court construed the provider exceptions to the Stored Communications Act 
liberally and deemed Councilman to fall within them. Id. at 79. With regard to the Wiretap Act, 
however, the appeals court overruled the lower court, concluding that the term “electronic 
communication” as used in the Wiretap Act includes transient electronic storage integral to the 
communication process, and therefore, an interception of an e-mail message in this transient storage is 
an offense under the Act. Id.  
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code76 can apply to business practices as well. For instance, a wide range 
of relatively common business practices have been challenged in civil 
suits under section 1030, including automated searches,77 dropping 
cookies,78 sending spam,79 changing hosts’ communication 
configurations,80 and port scanning.81 These same behaviors, some of 
which are behaviors of security-invasive DRM, may run afoul of computer 
intrusion law unless prior consent of the system owner is obtained.  
Similarly, behaviors prohibited in state spyware statutes include 
behaviors exhibited by security-invasive DRM.82 More than ten states 
have passed anti-spyware statutes.83 These statutes vary in their definition 
 
 
 76. For a discussion of the current state of criminal computer intrusion statutes see, e.g., Susan 
W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
1 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer 
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003). See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as 
Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003). 
 77. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001); Register.com, 
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. 
Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 78. In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (abrogated by Creative Computing v. 
Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 79. Christian v. Sony Corp. of Am., 152 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Minn. 2001); America 
Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
 80. See, e.g., In re AOL, Inc., Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 
2001) (finding that AOL’s transmission of its Version 5 software which allegedly “changes” the host 
system’s communications configuration and settings to interfere with non-AOL communications and 
services deemed actionable under 1030(a)(5)(A)); Christian, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (deeming the 
inclusion of a defective FDC constituted a “transmission” within the meaning of section 1030). 
 81. See Steve Brewer, County Cuts Off Computer Network, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 21, 
2002, at A29, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/topstory/1302663#top. See also 
Ann Harrison, Plea Agreement In Distributed Computing Case, SECURITYFOCUS, Jan. 18, 2002, 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/311; John Leyden, Ethical Hacker Faces War Driving Charges, 
THE REGISTER, July 26, 2002, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/07/26/ethical_hacker_faces_war_ 
driving/. As a result, computer security professionals fear that distributed computing itself may be 
illegal. See Ann Harrison, Is Distributed Computing A Crime?, SECURITYFOCUS, Dec. 20, 2001, 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/300. 
 82. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.792, 45.45.794, 45.45.798 (Supp. 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 44-7301–7304 (Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-111-101–105 (Supp. 2007); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-150–157 (2007); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.8-1-1–24.4.8-3-2 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715.1–8 (West Supp. 2007); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-H1–H6 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001–
102(Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101–401 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 
(2004 & Supp. 2006) (requiring malicious intent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.270.010–900 (West 
2007). 
 83. To date, despite several attempts, no federal statute explicitly addresses spyware. See, e.g., 
Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283 (2005); 
Susan B. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 
(2005); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1269 (2005); Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 
(2005). 
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of spyware, as well as in the regulatory approaches they adopt, but 
generally also focus on prohibited behavior as behavior that lacks user 
consent. They set forth prohibitions on various conduct including software 
that changes user settings, software that cannot be uninstalled, software 
that usurps user control of a machine, and software that sends data to 
remote third parties, among others.84 In other words, they criminally 
prohibit the behaviors exhibited by security-invasive DRM without user 
consent. 
C. Contract Law and Theory 
The legal nexus of digital consent is contract law. For many bodies of 
law, the technology revolution has added a complicating factor to the legal 
equation; in contract law, the uneasy peace of doctrine around form 
contracts/contracts of adhesion has been permanently disrupted.85 As seen 
in the context of DRM, it is user consent to a form digital contract that 
 
 
 84. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 83. 
 85. For a discussion of the tension between freedom of contract and consumer protection, see, 
e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing significance of the distinction between default and 
mandatory rules for consumers); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and 
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 871 (1992) (describing a “conflict between the two aspects 
of the liberal conception of contractual freedom: freedom to contract and freedom from contract” 
(citing Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 194 (1982))); Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (asserting that rules created by trade 
association to govern contractual disputes diverge from rules contained in Article 2 of U.C.C.); 
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
489 (1989) (discussing the role of default rules); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and 
the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 252 (1995) (“[T]he problem raised by contracts to 
govern thick relationships is not a problem of unconscionability. Usually, neither party to such a 
relationship will have exploited the other at the time the contract was made. Quite the contrary, both 
parties will have probably been subject to exactly the same cognitive limits.”); Christine Jolls, 
Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
203, 205 (1997) (“Contrary to traditional wisdom, the parties to a contract may be better off if the law 
enables them to tie their hands, or ties their hands for them, in a way that prevents them from taking 
advantage of certain ex post profitable modification opportunities.”); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (describing network effects 
and the potential for suboptimal contracts); Zvika Neeman, The Freedom to Contract and the Free-
Rider Problem, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 685 (1999) (arguing that a person contracting with multiple 
actors can induce them to refrain from acting in their collective interest); Eric A. Posner, Essay, 
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 
842 (2003) (“The premises of economics push in the direction of freedom of contract, and this current 
can be resisted only with difficulty.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (arguing that mandatory contract rules should 
center on regulating contracts tinged by unconscionability, fraud, or duress, and contracts that create 
externalities).  
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usually creates a critical legal distinction between legal and illegal digital 
conduct. 
1. Why Digital Consent and Technology-Mediated Form Contracts are 
Different from Real Space Form Contracts 
It is true that technology contracting triggers the age-old form contract 
doctrinal debate—customization versus standardization. However, the 
contours of this debate are altered in a digital medium. As Professor Radin 
has pointed out in the context of the internet,86 the internet’s increasing 
content customization in transactions is perhaps fundamentally 
incompatible with content owners’ need for predictability in outcome and 
reliance on standardization through form contracts.  
Technology-mediated contracting is a qualitatively different experience 
for users than real space contracting.87 Individuals who might attempt to 
read a form contract in real space may behave differently in technology-
mediated contracting contexts.88 Unlike in many real space contract 
situations, inputs in technology contracting scenarios are impoverished: 
parties to contracts mediated by technology are rarely in the same room or 
in contact through any real time method. No humans are readily 
accessible; asking questions about the meaning of contractual terms 
becomes a cumbersome, if not impossible, undertaking. The importance of 
objective indicators of consent plays a greater role in virtual space than it 
might in real space. However, even objective consent determinations by 
 
 
 86. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002). See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–
20 (1997). 
 87. See, e.g., United States and International Perspectives on Electronic Marketplaces, 14 INT’L 
L. PRACTICUM 68, 74 (2001) (including the comments of Michael M. Maney). For discussion of 
business and consumer concerns in particular technology contracting contexts, see, e.g., Anita L. 
Allen, Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy and e-Commerce, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 751 (2001); Jay P. 
Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services—An Empirical Re-
Assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 (2005); 
Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006); Anita Ramasastry, State 
Escheat Statutes and Possible Treatment of Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New 
Payment Mechanisms, 57 BUS. LAW. 475 (2001); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: 
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333 (2006).  
 88. Users behave differently in real and virtual space. For example, although most people would 
be hesitant to share the keys to their home with others or use the same key for both the door to their 
home and office, users engage in password sharing for websites frequently and usually use the same 
password for multiple websites. See, e.g., Shannon Riley, Password Security: What Users Know and 
What They Actually Do, USABILITY NEWS, Aug. 1, 2006, http://psychology.wichita.edu/surl/ 
usabilitynews/81/Passwords.htm.  
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courts have limitations in digital context. For example, unlike in real space 
where each form contract copy is physically identical, “objective” factors, 
such as the size of text on a screen, may vary from computer to 
computer.89  
Therefore, new technologies have generated challenges to determining 
meaningful consent, challenges that exist in digital form contracts but do 
not exist in real space form contracts. As a consequence, the risks of 
unconscionability in digital form contracts are higher than risks in real 
space contracts. The state of current digital contracting doctrine does not 
adequately reflect these subtleties. In the context of technology-mediated 
contracts and avoiding unconscionability, a stronger medium-specific 
contract doctrine of consent is needed. 
2. The Current State of Digital Contracting Doctrine 
To date, courts have approached the analysis of digital consent by 
focusing on objective procedural aspects of digital consent. Currently, 
courts are building doctrine around procedural fairness of digital consent 
through four lead cases—ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,90 Register.com, Inc. 
v. Verio, Inc.,91 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,92 and the most 
recent iteration of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.93 These cases 
discuss the process of formation from an objective perspective and, 
specifically, whether a reasonable user is likely to have known digital 
consent was being given.94  
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, an individual purchased software that 
displayed license terms in a “clickwrap” format95 on the computer screen 
every time the user executed the software program. In other words, the 
user affirmatively demonstrated assent to the User Agreements by 
 
 
 89. Bob Baumel, Understanding Cross-Platform Text Size Differences (Jan. 2, 2004), 
http://home.earthlink.net/~bobbau/platforms/text-size/. 
 90. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  
 91. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 92. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 93. No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 07, 2003).  
 94. None of these cases have focused on the inability to negotiate the terms of the User 
Agreements. Nonnegotiability is a hallmark of contracts of adhesion and is a factor that may 
demonstrate procedural unconscionability of a contract.  
 95. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). Clickwrap is the term used to 
describe an agreement presentation that appears in a window that opens to reveal the text of the 
agreement. The agreement is accompanied by a dialogue box with the button label “I agree” that the 
user must click prior to gaining access to the website content. For a discussion of clickwrap and 
browsewrap agreements, see, e.g., Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475 (2002). 
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selecting “yes” or “ok” on the screen.96 The Seventh Circuit deemed the 
user to have had sufficient opportunity and notice in order to review the 
terms and to return the software if he did not wish to consent.97 
Consequently, the purchaser was contractually bound because of click-
through consent to the terms which were conspicuously displayed on his 
screen.98 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. presented a slightly more 
nuanced internet contracting inquiry. A domain name registrar sued a 
service provider who repeatedly requested data electronically for 
marketing purposes from the website of the domain name registrar in 
violation of the registrar’s User Agreements.99 After each such query, the 
service provider was presented with a notice that the act of querying 
constituted consent to the registrar’s User Agreements.100 Because of the 
large number of times the service provider encountered the explicit, 
conspicuous notice of being bound by the registrar’s User Agreements, 
and because of the service provider’s acknowledgment that it was aware of 
the existence of the User Agreements, the court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff registrar.101 Thus, repeated exposure to a conspicuous notice of 
User Agreements presented in a sentence was deemed to constitute 
affirmative consent to the terms.102  
However, Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. explained that if a 
website does not explicitly and clearly communicate that by clicking a 
download button or taking another action a consumer is assenting to User 
Agreements, such User Agreements would not be upheld.103 In Specht, the 
defendants moved to compel arbitration under the terms of a license 
agreement which was presented through a small link to the User 
Agreements at the bottom of the homepage.104 The website at issue used a 
link that said “terms,” and was presented below-the-fold in unremarkable 
type.105 The defendants in Specht argued that the plaintiffs should be held 
to a standard of “reasonable prudence,” and that they should have known 
to scroll to the bottom of the webpage to look for license terms. The court 
 
 
 96. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1453.  
 99. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241. 
 100. Id. at 242 
 101. Id. at 254. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 104. In Specht, internet users and a website operator brought a putative class action, alleging that a 
free software program invaded their privacy by transmitting information to the software provider 
without users’ consent. Id at 586.  
 105. Id.  
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rejected this argument, noting that license terms on a screen not readily 
visible are not enforceable when the defendant does not provide 
conspicuous notice of their existence to users.106 According to the Specht 
court, characteristics of unclear “browsewrap” links include use of small 
font, such as the font used for these footnotes, gray type on gray 
background, and unclear labeling of the link that intended to alert the user 
to the existence of an agreement behind the link.107 Finally, the second 
iteration of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.108 introduced a new 
generation of homepage User Agreement presentation. The Ticketmaster 
website presented a link to its User Agreements at the top of its homepage 
by embedding the link to the User Agreements in a sentence which stated 
that by browsing the website, the user was affirmatively consenting to be 
bound by the Ticketmaster User Agreements.109 Ticketmaster argued that 
Tickets.com, among other things, violated the Ticketmaster User 
Agreements by copying ticket and show information off the Ticketmaster 
website through the use of spiders and bots110 on a continuous basis in 
violation of the Ticketmaster User Agreements. Ticketmaster asserted 
Tickets.com was bound by the User Agreements because it had received 
notice of being bound by them through the browsewrap111 embedded in a 
notice sentence on the Ticketmaster homepage. Tickets.com sought 
summary judgment on all counts, and the court deciding the matter 
dismissed all counts by Ticketmaster against Tickets.com except for this 
allegation in contract. The court deemed the contract issue worthy of 
surviving summary judgment; the obvious placement of the link to the 
User Agreements at the top of the Ticketmaster homepage and the link’s 
being embedded in an explicit notice sentence of contract formation 
“could not be missed.”112 
 
 
 106. Id. at 596. 
 107. Id. A browsewrap is an agreement whose content is linked and no additional notice aside 
from the presence of the link is provided to the consumer regarding the existence of the agreement. 
 108. No. CV997654MLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 07, 2003). The first 
iteration of a lawsuit between the same parties ended with Ticketmaster’s User Agreements not being 
upheld by the court deciding the matter. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 00-56574, 2001 
WL 51509 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 109. This notice sentence browsewrap presentation from around the time of the second 
Ticketmaster litigation can be viewed at Internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20030403073630/www.ticketmaster.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). 
 110. Spiders and bots are small computer applications that run in the background and send data 
back to their originator on an ongoing basis. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and 
Bots, Oh My: The Economic Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts that Restrict Data 
Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3.  
 111. See supra note 109. 
 112. Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289 at *2. 
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When taken together, these four cases can be said to create a sliding 
scale of User Agreement enforceability. On the one hand, clickwrap 
agreements that prevent the user from accessing content without an 
explicit affirmative demonstration of consent will tend to be enforced by 
courts.113 On the other hand, courts tend to decline to enforce a 
browsewrap agreement114 with an ambiguous link located below-the-
fold115 with no affirmative demonstration of consent by the user.116 In 
between these two extremes are browsewrap agreements which might be 
called “notice sentence browsewraps.”117 These “notice sentence 
browsewraps” intend to provide notice to a user of User Agreements 
through their placement and presentation of a link to the terms, usually in 
a full sentence above-the-fold on the homepage. In other words, the user is 
advised that taking a certain action constitutes consent to the terms of the 
linked agreement—the User Agreement presentation upheld by the 
Ticketmaster court.118 The more objectively conspicuous the notice of 
terms, the more likely a court is to determine a contract is procedurally fair 
and that digital consent exists.  
Under the current approach courts apply, commonality in 
understanding of the User Agreement between users and the content owner 
is not the critical inquiry, nor is the actual understanding of users. 
Currently, the only critical inquiry courts undertake is whether the terms 
of the User Agreement are presented in a conspicuous manner. If 
presentation is conspicuous in the subjective opinion of the court, the court 
deems consent to exist and enforces the terms as drafted and understood 
 
 
 113. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 114. See, e.g., Casamiquela, supra note 95.  
 115. Below-the-fold means the portion of the graphical user interface which is not readily visible 
to a user within the confines of the user’s monitor when the website loads. Accordingly, above-the-
fold is the readily visible portion. See, e.g., Marketingterms.com, http://www.marketingterms.com/ 
dictionary/above_the_fold/ (last visited May 3, 2004). 
 116. In Specht, the court deemed browsewrap User Agreements without a notice sentence and 
below-the-fold to be unenforceable. Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 117. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Verio, 
the court deemed the defendant to have notice of the browsewrap User Agreements in a notice 
sentence within a data entry dialog box. Id. at 254. See also Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *6. 
In Ticketmaster (2003), above-the-fold browsewrap User Agreements embedded in a notice sentence 
were deemed adequate to survive summary judgment challenge to contract claim. Id.  
 118. At the time of this writing, Ticketmaster has changed the placement of their User Agreement 
link on their homepage following the Ticketmaster case. However, the notice sentence browsewrap 
remains. See, e.g., Ticketmaster, http://www.ticketmaster.com (last visited May 2, 2006) for an 
example of a notice browsewrap User Agreement presentation. See, e.g., Yahoo!, http://www. 
yahoo.com (last visited May 2, 2006) for an example of a traditional browsewrap User Agreement 
presentation. 
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by the content owner. Thus, our current system can be depicted by Figure 
A below. Each circle represents a party to a User Agreement and the links 
represent commonalities of understanding of User Agreements. It is likely 
that many users will have common (mis)understandings of a User 
Agreement. However, the extent to which these user understandings 
overlap with each other, and especially with the understanding of the 
drafter, a content owner, is unknown. This deficit in mutual understanding, 
or “meeting of the minds,” is represented by a question mark in Figure A. 
FIGURE A: CONSENT IN OUR CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
3. Both Williston’s and Corbin’s Definitions of Unconscionability are 
Met by Many User Agreements 
Current case law’s sliding scale of procedural fairness in execution of 
digital contracts is only half the picture. The other half relates to 
substantive fairness and preventing unfair surprise.119 In the United States, 
 
 
 119. I am rejecting Epstein’s argument that the only appropriate basis for findings of 
unconscionability include fraud, duress and undue influence. I recognize “unfair trade practices” that 
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challenges120 could be brought to User Agreements on the basis of either 
or both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. 
To date, courts have focused solely on the procedural unconscionability, 
framing opinions using the language of consent.121 This approach 
comports with neither Williston’s nor Corbin’s approach to 
unconscionability and merits reassessment. 
Under traditional constructions of ensuring fairness and preventing 
unconscionability, procedural and substantive fairness are sometimes 
incorporated into a type of Willistonian sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability that combines both procedural and substantive factors in 
its analysis.122 The method of execution and the complicated content in 
most User Agreements, when taken together, render most User 
Agreements wholly inaccessible to an average user, eviscerating the 
existence of meaningful consent under Williston’s approach. Similarly, 
Corbin’s test of unconscionability, which examines the terms in light of 
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade, is also met in the context of many User Agreements.123 
Under Corbin’s approach, User Agreements are allegedly authorizing 
conduct of ostensibly reputable companies, conduct that, in the opinion of 
other reputable companies in the same business, crosses the line into 
unwanted, even potentially illegal conduct as Part I of this Article 
describes.  In the case study of invasive technologies such as security-
invasive DRM, the combined weight of these two sets of factors bespeaks 
the urgency of reconstructing how and to what reasonable consumers 
 
 
fall short of fraud in other legal contexts, and this concept seems logical to include in contract law as 
well. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975). 
For additional views of unconscionability see, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in 
Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123 (2005); Philip Bridwell, The 
Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (2003); 
Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity 
From the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187 (2005); Horacio Spector, A 
Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95 (2006). 
 120. European Union grounds for invalidation of User Agreements content include violation of, 
among other directives, the European Union Directive on Distance Contracts and the Directive on 
Unfair Terms. See James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: 
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109 (2003). 
 121. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (focusing on consent in 
contract formation). 
 122. See 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1763A, at 213 (3d 
ed. 1972). 
 123. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128, at 188 (1952). 
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meaningfully consent. As previously discussed, companies using these 
invasive DRM methods frequently intentionally cloak their presence on 
user systems, inhibiting full understanding of their workings by almost all 
users. Meanwhile, other technology companies have labeled this type of 
DRM to be spyware rather than a legitimate intellectual property 
protection. Thus, under either Williston’s or Corbin’s standard for 
unconscionability, meaningful user consent to User Agreements is 
unlikely to exist in many instances. Consequently, relying on digital 
consent to User Agreements to authorize conduct otherwise tantamount to 
computer intrusion is a dubious legal approach. Users can not always find 
or understand the User Agreements to which they have allegedly 
consented. This difficulty arises both because of users’ lack of technology 
knowledge and because of the agreements themselves.124  
To resolve a portion of this doctrinal noise, courts should adopt a new 
approach for objectively assessing digital consent, an approach that would 
ensure User Agreements are likely to pass both Williston’s and Corbin’s 
tests for unconscionability. The next section introduces one such possible 
approach—an objective reasonable digital consumer standard.  
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CODE: REDUCING NOISE THROUGH THE 
“REASONABLE DIGITAL CONSUMER”  
Crafting an ideal legal regime of digital consent means taking into 
account three fundamental ecological tensions in the technology 
contracting space: (i) a macrosystem-level tension between content 
entrepreneurship and consumer protection, (ii) a mesosystem-level tension 
between legal content customization and legal standardization, and (iii) a 
microsystem-level tension in simultaneously aiding development of both 
content owners and users, despite an information power imbalance in 
favor of the content owner. 
 
 
 124. Similarly the U.C.C.’s approach to unconscionability would not save these User Agreements. 
U.C.C. section 2-302 requires a tribunal to focus on the commercial setting surrounding the transaction 
in question before making its determination as to unconscionability. U.C.C. § 2-302 (year). Here, even 
assuming that U.C.C. applies, a question that is not clear, the commercial standards are unclear and 
developing uniform law in this context would be hindered. It might also be argued that perhaps courts 
are adopting Professor Epstein’s approach to unconscionability. Professor Epstein borrows the 
dichotomy between procedural and substantive unconscionability constructed by Professor Leff to 
argue that the only acceptable bases for unconscionability are solely procedural defects in formation. 
The substance of contractual provisions are not a primary concern under Epstein’s approach. However 
some variants of DRM can be deemed to have even crossed Epstein’s line: they install themselves 
prior to providing a copy of the user agreement for review. See Epstein, supra note 119, at 294. See 
also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 486–87 (1967). 
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On the macrosystem or social level,125 a successful technology 
contracting architecture doctrinally constructs consent in a manner that 
both facilitates consumer protection concerns and allows for efficient 
business operations. It is only when both these interests are served that a 
stable, trusted commercial technology environment will develop. In other 
words, the need for innovation must be successfully balanced with the 
need for mass utilization126 and continuous evolution in the technology 
and intellectual property space.127 Practically speaking, this means 
creating a construction of consent that assists companies in mitigating 
business risk on the one hand, in exchange for ethical128 treatment of users 
on the other.  
The mesosystem or interpersonal level129 of a successful architecture 
for technology contracting should foster development of relational 
commercial trust between the parties. Thus, machine-text convergence130 
appears to be an inevitability; the ever-increasing customization of digital 
content must be reconciled with legal predictability on a transaction-by- 
transaction basis.131 In each transaction through a technology-mediated 
contract, users should have a meaningful opportunity to read and 
 
 
 125. This section adopts an ecological framework of analysis loosely based on the work of Urie 
Bronfenbrenner. See URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 258 (1979). 
Macrosystem-level analysis requires examination at the level of culture as a whole, along with belief 
systems and ideologies underlying cultural rules and norms. In other words, the analysis focuses on the 
mechanisms of social governance and the worldview prevalent in civil society. Id.  
 126. Adopting the language of architectural theorist Le Corbusier, the question of internet data 
security contracting asks us to balance the need for constant architectural innovation with the need for 
mass utilization of the architecture. Creativity must coincide with functionality for the people who 
exist within the space. See LE CORBUSIER, TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 265 (1931). 
 127. Turning to the lessons of cybernetics theory, Norbert Weiner’s work, as expanded by 
cybernetics theorist Gordon Pask, points us to the importance of constructing architectures with 
feedback loops. Stagnancy in construction does not enable evolution of a space and results in 
obsolescence. NORBERT WEINER, CYBERNETICS 113 (1948); Gordon Pask, The Architectural 
Relevance of Cybernetics, 9 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 494, 496 (1969). 
 128. I use “ethical” here to refer to truthful disclosure and fulfillment of promised contractual 
obligations. 
 129. The mesosytem or interpersonal level of analysis focuses attention on interpersonal dynamics 
and the dynamics between the individual and secondary settings, such as work or business partners. 
BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 125, at 209. In other words, mesosystem refers to the level of each 
commercial exchange between a content owner and a user.  
 130. When Radin discusses machine-text convergence she means that legal and technical 
standardization are closely related and that a paradigm shift is occurring in the manner in which we 
conceptualize contracting. Radin, supra note 86, at 1138–39. 
 131. One option for reconciling this tension is creating standardization of process in lieu of 
standardization of content. Standardized process, meaning fair and uniform contract formation and 
enforcement rules, can provide a stable basis for contractual interpretation, while customized content 
both enables the user to obtain value for her data and contract upon terms of her choice. 
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understand the terms of User Agreements that govern their relationships, 
should they wish to do so. 
Finally, on the microsystem or individual level of analysis, a successful 
digital contracting architecture would simultaneously foster development 
and economic self-realization of both the content owner132 and user. In 
other words, development is a social process, and it is critical to 
acknowledge the influence of the social environment and its tools on 
development.133 From the perspective of the companies that author User 
Agreements, a successful legal architecture of consent enables predictable 
outcomes for business development, expansion, and greater economic self-
realization without unduly burdensome legal commitments to users. 
Meanwhile, from a user’s developmental perspective, a successful consent 
architecture scaffolds134 the user in technology contracting, protecting 
them from possible harms due to companies’ unethical conduct. Perhaps 
most importantly, a successful technology contracting architecture may 
also assist users in evolving to view technology as a natural extension of 
their being.135  
Elaborating on these concerns differently, the ideal architecture for 
digital consent would generate an exact overlap of understood meaning 
among users and a content owner. This meaning would be memorialized 
in a User Agreement that articulated all material risks faced by both users 
and the content owner. All parties in this ideal universe would share an 
identical understanding of the terms and no disagreements of meaning 
would arise. In Figure B below, each circle represents a party to the User 
Agreement and each link represents a commonality in understanding of 
the User Agreement’s terms. Using the language of network theory, one 
could argue that consent in an ideal system resembles a highly 
interconnected random network, a network where no node is likely to be 
 
 
 132. Content owners are not necessarily large entities. One of the primary cultural shifts 
precipitated by the internet is a rise in entrepreneurship because the transaction costs of internet 
business are significantly lower than those in real space. Therefore, a content owner could be one 
individual entrepreneur who relies on an internet business as a primary source of income. 
 133. The perspective adopted here is that of nonlinear contextualist human development theory. 
As such, it views development as a dialectical process with the environment that uses the “cultural 
tools” of the environment to facilitate development. For a discussion of cultural tools, see James V. 
Wertsch & Peeter Tulviste, L.S. Vygotsky and Contemporary Developmental Psychology, in AN 
INTRODUCTION TO VYGOTSKY 59, 67 (Harry Daniels ed., 2d ed. 2005). See also, e.g., LEV VYGOTSKY, 
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962). 
 134. The education theory concept of scaffolding refers to allowing a student to learn for herself 
while providing assistance to ensure her success. See KATHLEEN HOGAN & MICHAEL PRESSLEY, 
SCAFFOLDING STUDENT LEARNING: INSTRUCTIONAL APPROACHES AND ISSUES 9 (1997). 
 135. Users may develop a type of commercial identity that will evolve away the perceived 
“specialness” of technology contracting. 
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more connected than any other node.136 Enforcement of the understanding 
of the User Agreement held by any node in an ideal system is equally 
likely to reflect the understanding of every other node. Unfortunately, this 
ideal universe cannot exist because of differences in sophistication and 
power among various consumers and content providers.  
FIGURE B: CONSENT IN AN IDEAL SYSTEM 
 
 
As described in the preceding sections, user consent, ostensibly 
demonstrated through User Agreements, is the lynchpin between the law 
of intellectual property and computer intrusion. Similarly, as demonstrated 
by Figure A, the structure of our current consent architecture does not 
resemble the ideal structure of consent in Figure B. It is not the case that 
enforcement of any node’s understanding of a User Agreement is equally 
likely to reflect the understanding of any other node. Therefore, the 
commonality of understanding may need to be legally generated. This 
section proposes one possible legal approach to mitigate the doctrinal 
noise in a manner sensitive to the three sets of ecological concerns set 
 
 
 136. In random networks, at the peak of the distribution, one assumes that a majority of nodes 
reflect the same number of links; nodes that have a significant difference in the number of links are an 
aberration. See, e.g., BARABASI, infra note 156, at 55–72. 
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forth above. This section advocates objectively defining digital consent 
through generating a standard contingent on empirical testing of the  legal 
usability of agreements on real consumers.  
A. Constructing the “Reasonable Digital Consumer” in the Context of 
Digital Contracting 
As previously described in Part II, the law of digital contracting 
currently relies solely on objective indicators of consent in determining 
whether digital contracts are binding on users. Case law to date has 
examined issues relating to procedural fairness in generating an objective 
basis for believing consumer consent is present, but as yet has not 
adequately explored issues of consent triggered by the substantive fairness 
of contractual provisions. Meanwhile, the most common defense that 
arises in cases involving controversial technology contracting situations, 
such as those surrounding the User Agreements relating to invasive DRM, 
is that the consumer consented to the DRM though the User Agreement.137 
A court is then left to determine whether the User Agreement is 
enforceable and whether the consumer consented to the installation of the 
DRM.  
Deciding whether consumer consent existed in a particular case can be 
accomplished through legally and empirically constructing a “reasonable 
digital consumer” standard. Specifically, through borrowing legal methods 
of constructing “reasonable” consumers from trademark law138 and 
 
 
 137. User Agreements frequently contain the following types of terms, some of which may 
ultimately be deemed unconscionable: an explicit assent by user to be bound by use at own risk; 
incorporation of other product specific agreements by reference; an intellectual property rights retainer 
for the website owner or services provider; a limited intellectual property license to use for the user; an 
assignment of rights by the user in communications with the website; a disclaimer of any 
representations and warranties in connection with the website or services; a disclaimer of 
responsibility for third party content; a limitation of liability; a user indemnification for damages 
arising out of the user’s use of the site or poor security behaviors such as password management; a 
prohibition on linking; a conduct code for the website; a securities disclaimer relating to forward 
looking statements and updating of content; a securities disclaimer stating no offer of securities is 
made through the site; user representations and warranties related to security of passwords, user 
warranties related to providing of notice about problem with password or leakage of data; a 
termination provision with no notice by the content owner; a choice of law provision; a choice of 
venue and consent to jurisdiction provision; a severability provision; a provision stipulating unilateral 
amendment of terms by the content owner; a provision stipulating unilateral amendment of site content 
on no notice; an integration clause; a provision providing for selective enforcement of remedies under 
the agreement by the content owner; and a prohibition on user assignment of rights and obligations 
under the User Agreements. 
 138. For discussion of trademark harms and the manner in which they are adjudicated by courts, 
see, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose 
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importing them into the law of digital contracts, a standard for objective 
consent can be crafted. In this manner, objective consent becomes more 
readily determinable by courts and business entities alike, possibly 
triggering implied protections of neglected sections under the DMCA. 
This method of constructing objective consent also leverages the dynamic 
emergent processes already visible in the law and in digital contracting 
practices today.139 
A consent regime predicated on an empirically constructed reasonable 
consumer would be built as follows. When a company drafts a new User 
Agreement, it would conduct a “legal usability test”140 to ensure 
predictable outcomes in enforcement of the User Agreement. Many 
companies will not necessarily perceive this as unduly burdensome 
because they already run usability tests for their products on a regular 
basis.141 For example, a company selling dancing pig screensaver 
downloads would likely conduct empirical tests with users to determine 
whether the user can successfully navigate the user interface and download 
the new dancing purple pig screensaver. During this product usability test, 
the company would add in a series of questions and exercises to test 
whether the users can also successfully navigate the user interface to read 
 
 
Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2005); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); David J. Franklyn, 
Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in 
American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a 
Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of “Paternity”?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 379 (2005); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 
507 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and 
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search 
Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1759 (2006); Gideon Parchomovsky, On 
Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211; Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 
(2005). 
 139. Through creating a reasonable digital consumer standard that evolves as consumer 
knowledge evolves, a sustainable standard can be crafted in a manner similar to the way evolutionary 
standards have been crafted in other areas of law, such as trademark law.  
 140. When I speak of legal usability I do not merely mean an expert counting numbers of syllables 
or words. I refer to a statistically significant sample of consumers interacting with an actual contract 
and attempting to derive meaning from it. For a discussion of early “usability” tests of counting 
syllables, such as the Flesch test, see, e.g., E.B. WHITE, THE SECOND TREE FROM THE CORNER 166 
(1954).  
 141. Usability testing of user interfaces is an almost universal practice in the software industry. 
The major critiques of usability testing include the assertions that results are inaccurate because users 
are paid for participation, know they are being studied, and are generally using a machines that are not 
their own in the study. For a discussion of usability testing, see, e.g., CAROL M. BARNUM, USABILITY 
TESTING AND RESEARCH (2001); JOSEPH S. DUMAS & JANICE C. REDISH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
USABILITY TESTING (1999); JAKOB NIELSEN, USABILITY ENGINEERING (1994); JEFFREY RUBIN, 
HANDBOOK OF USABILITY TESTING: HOW TO PLAN, DESIGN, AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE TESTS (1994). 
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and understand the User Agreement. In this way, companies would begin 
to view the User Agreement as an integral part of the product and worry 
about its functionality to the same extent they worry about the 
functionality of the product itself. These usability tests, if conducted 
thoroughly, would demonstrate which provisions and User Agreements 
consumers regularly fail to understand. Under this framework, a particular 
incentive exists to ensure that users understand provisions allowing a 
content provider to engage in behaviors otherwise prohibited by law. If 
this usability tested User Agreement is subsequently challenged in court, a 
finder of fact only needs to examine the validity of the usability test and its 
results, rather than constructing a theoretical “reasonable consumer” from 
the mind of the judge. If no usability test was done preemptively at the 
time of the litigation, the court would order a test be performed by a court-
appointed expert.  
This construction of a reasonable consumer to determine liability is not 
entirely novel. Trademark law has long used empirical consumer testing in 
litigation to ascertain whether the likelihood of consumer confusion exists. 
In a trademark case, if a plaintiff alleges that consumers were confused by 
the similarity between the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark, the 
plaintiff has the burden of providing evidence showing a likelihood of 
confusion.142 The manner in which plaintiffs frequently demonstrate this 
likelihood is through presenting empirical survey evidence, which shows 
that consumers were actually confused by the relationship between the two 
marks.143 A showing of actual confusion through empirical survey 
evidence is deemed strong evidence toward finding infringement.144 
Conversely, a defendant’s demonstration that empirical survey evidence 
shows consumers were not confused by the relationship of two marks 
strongly refutes a plaintiff’s allegation of confusion and infringement. This 
model can be adapted to the digital contracting context.  
Specifically, in the context of security-invasive DRM, one can obtain 
empirical evidence to demonstrate whether a reasonable consumer was 
confused or is likely to have consented to the installation of the DRM in 
 
 
 142. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (T.T.A.B. 2004), 
available at  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/other/2004/92032360.pdf. 
 143. For example, in a famous cancellation petition before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board regarding the servicemark “Realtor,” a battle of empirical 
studies occurred with the board assessing the validity and strength of each. See id.  
 144. See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., No. 00-55293, 00-55599, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18344, at *13 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a 
survey demonstrating actual consumer confusion may be sufficient to prove a likelihood of confusion 
as a matter of law. Id. Likelihood of confusion is a key element of proving infringement. Id.  
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question. Provided that this empirical evidence is collected and analyzed 
in accordance with generally accepted social science research methods, 
results can reveal the likelihood that a reasonable consumer was able to 
find and understand the User Agreement allegedly authorizing the DRM 
installation. The study would be performed by asking a sample group145 of 
consumers a series of questions probing their understanding of the User 
Agreement at issue. The questions would examine the following subjects. 
Was the user presented with the User Agreement before the security-
invasive DRM installed itself? At the time the user first used the product 
accompanied by security-invasive DRM, was the user aware that he had 
entered into a contract involving the DRM? Was the user expressly 
advised that security-invasive DRM may potentially jeopardize the 
security of the user’s system, and did the user understand what this meant? 
Was the extent of the risk explained? Was the DRM-particular behavior 
being litigated explicitly authorized or understood by a reasonable 
consumer through the User Agreement? For example, do users understand 
that terms such as “a small proprietary software program”146 when used in 
a User Agreement, unless clearly defined,147 can be referring to rootkits 
and other malware, types of code generally used by hackers that harm 
security? If the answer to these types of questions is yes, then consent is 
deemed to exist and the User Agreement is deemed enforceable. If, 
however, one or more of these key elements does not exist, the contract is 
deemed unenforceable on the basis of an absence of meaningful 
consent.148  
 
 
 145. In empirical research, the larger the sample and the more carefully the sample is constructed, 
the more generalizable the results. Samples with fewer than thirty subjects are usually deemed flawed. 
For a discussion of proper sampling methodology see, e.g., WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING 
TECHNIQUES (1977); PAUL S. LEVY & STANLEY LEMESHOW, SAMPLING OF POPULATIONS : METHODS 
AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1991). 
 146. This language was used in Sony’s User Agreement to describe the rootkit installed by Sony 
CDs on user machines that created a security hole on user machines and allowed hackers to take 
control of these machines. See infra note 148.  
 147. For a defense of textualist contract analysis, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 85, at 568 n.50 
(proposing textualism for interpretation of contract between commercial parties). But see Steven J. 
Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
115, 139 (1993) (“[E]ven if efficiency justified enforcing deals the parties made, the justification for 
enforcing a deal made by the parties is not a justification for enforcing a deal they did not make.”); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1223, 1224–28 (1999) (“[M]odern celebration of the authority of text threatens to consign the doctrine 
of good faith to an inconsequential marginal note in the law of contracts. . . . [E]very expressly 
conferred contractual power is presumptively absolute and unrestricted.”). 
 148. Using the language of one of the Sony-BMG User Agreements involved in litigation, a 
usability test would question whether a reasonable user understands that the following language 
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Intellectual property holders draft User Agreements solely for the 
purpose of obtaining additional benefits over and above what they already 
possess in intellectual property law. A finding of inadequate consent to a 
User Agreement would mean that the intellectual property owner is not 
entitled to the additional benefits carved out in the User Agreement, but 
the owner still retains all those rights explicitly provided under intellectual 
property law. As such, in the event that a User Agreement is deemed 
unenforceable, content owners would not be stripped of all intellectual 
property protections. The only benefits content owners would be denied 
are those additional benefits sought through contracts that were not theirs 
already by virtue of law. On the consumer side, a finding that a User 
Agreement is unenforceable due to lack of consent opens the door to 
possible civil or criminal litigation against the intellectual property holder. 
Without consent, as was previously discussed, security-invasive DRM can 
be legally reclassified as an actionable computer intrusion for installation 
of code on a third party machine.149  
 
 
authorized installation of a rootkit that could be exploited by third parties to remotely control the 
user’s machine and collect data from the user’s hard drive:  
As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the EULA, this CD 
will automatically install a small proprietary software program (the “SOFTWARE”) onto 
your computer. The software is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the CD, and it 
may also facilitate your use of the digital content. Once installed, the software will reside on 
your computer until removed or deleted. However, the software will not be used at any time 
to collect any personal information from you, whether stored on your computer or otherwise. 
See Sony User Agreement, http://us.mcafee.com/virusInfo/default.asp?id=description&virus_k= 
136855 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). Further, the language in the limitation of liability in this EULA 
limits consumer recovery for any bad acts of Sony’s “small proprietary software” to $5 in some states: 
“IN ANY CASE, THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF THE SONY BMG PARTIES, COLLECTIVELY, 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS EULA SHALL BE LIMITED TO FIVE US DOLLARS (US 
$5.00).” Id.  
 149. A practical difficulty in civil and criminal suits resulting from unenforceable User 
Agreements under current computer intrusion law is the assessment of damages. The ECPA and the 
CFAA have been plagued by difficulty of quantifying damages for computer intrusions. For example, 
in the context of intentional violations, under the CFAA no statutory damages are available and courts 
vary in the ways they assess damages. Under § 1030(g), a private right of action is available for any 
victim who suffers “damage or loss” due to a violation of the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2000). 
Damage is defined under § 1030(e)(8) of the statute and requires either (A) losses aggregating $5,000 
during any one-year period to one or more individuals; (B) impairment to medical diagnosis or 
treatment; (C) physical injury to any person; or (D) a threat to public health or safety. § 1030(5)(a). 
Many plaintiffs have encountered problems meeting the $5,000 threshold for damages. Two schools of 
thought exist regarding the proper interpretation of the CFAA damage requirements in § 1030(g) 
creating a private right of action for anyone suffering “damage or loss.” While “damage” is defined 
and requires plaintiffs to meet a threshold of $5,000, the term “loss” is not clearly defined, causing 
courts to struggle with calculating damages. Courts have also differed as to whether damages to 
multiple plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit can be aggregated in order to meet the $5,000 threshold and 
the extent to which loss of goodwill can be included in calculations. But under the ECPA, minimum 
statutory damages of $10,000 are available for violations of Title I and $1,000 for violations of Title II, 
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B. Reducing “Noise” in the System: The Legal and Practical Benefits of 
Legal Usability Testing and the Reasonable Digital Consumer 
Standard 
Introducing legal usability testing and the “reasonable digital 
consumer” standard into contract law provides six principal legal and 
practical benefits to ease the current legal noise in our system. First, such 
an approach offers minimum disruption to the trend in prior digital 
contract case law toward objective, rather than subjective, determinations 
of consent. Simultaneously, it pushes case law toward the contractual ideal 
of the meeting of the minds. Second, it acknowledges that consumers’ 
understanding of contract terms is an emergent construct; it changes in 
response to external social influences over time. Third, constructing an 
objective consent standard through the empirical legal usability testing of 
contracts improves businesses’ ability to engage in effective legal risk 
management planning. To increase the likelihood of enforceability of 
agreements, businesses can choose to usability test them in advance of 
litigation to mitigate legal risk and re-test them when terms are changed. 
Fourth, this approach neither patronizes consumers as incapable of consent 
nor does it leave them without recourse for draconian and unconscionable 
contracts, or for code that harms the security of their systems. Fifth, an 
objective construction of consumer consent controls for the drastically 
varying levels of technological savvy among judges. Finally, this regime 
leverages the naturally occurring structures of organization in both the 
construction of legal consent and the way that legal forms are transmitted 
among the lawyers who draft User Agreements. 
 
 
in part because of the difficulty of quantifying damages for security breaches. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2520. However, a debate exists in the courts whether courts have the discretion not to award any 
damages in some cases. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
courts have discretion not to award damages); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428 (8th Cir. 1996); Nally 
v. Nally, 53 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts have discretion not to award damages). But 
see Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 713 (1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting in dicta that courts 
must award damages); Rogers v. Wood, 910 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts must award 
a minimum of $10,000 in statutory damages per violation); Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp. 283 
(D.P.R. 1993) (holding that courts must award damages). However, in this case of security-invasive 
DRM, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Copyright Act itself. For example, if Congress were to 
pass a statutory corollary allowing the minimum copyright statutory damages to apply to each instance 
of invasive DRM activity, the issue would be resolved. By using the statutory damages amounts 
specified by the Copyright Act as a basis for DRM intrusion damages, the issue of damages can be 
resolved.  
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1. Consonance with the Trends of Prior Digital Contracting Case Law 
and Moving Toward the Contractual Ideal  
To date, digital contracting case law has indicated a clear preference 
for objective constructions of consent over subjective constructions of 
consent. This preference arises in part because of the difficulty in 
determining subjective consent in digital context. An objective standard 
strikes a better balance between customization and standardization than a 
standard subjective to each transaction could offer. Similarly, language of 
“reasonable” consumer behaviors is doctrinally pervasive in both contract 
law and intellectual property law. Generating a reasonable digital 
consumer standard-of-consent continues these trends, resolving doctrinal 
tensions with minimal disruption to the preexisting system.  
Theoretically, adopting a reasonable digital consumer standard 
eliminates the deficit of a meeting of the minds set forth in Figure A. It 
also more closely approximates Figure B, the ideal structure of consent, 
than does our current regime. As illustrated in Figure C below, a 
reasonable digital consumer standard merges the subjective contractual 
interpretations of all parties to the User Agreement, i.e. both content 
owner and users, into one common objective understanding. It is as if a 
new person has been added to the contractual relationship, a person that 
always shares some understandings of both parties. The circles in Figure C 
represent these parties to the User Agreement and the links between them 
indicate a common understanding of a User Agreement term. In Figure A, 
our current legal regime, we cannot ascertain whether a link of common 
understanding exists between the content provider’s and users’ 
understanding of the User Agreement. In Figure C, we are more confident 
this link exists through the reasonable digital consumer standard. Unlike in 
Figure A where the content provider’s subjective understanding of terms is 
enforced absent procedural unfairness, Figure C shifts the doctrinal 
balance from purely procedural concerns to both procedural and 
substantive concerns. Concern over both procedure and substance has been 
the hallmark of the traditional unconscionability doctrine.150 A reasonable 
digital consumer standard checks the power imbalance between the 
content owners who draft User Agreements, and the users who are bound 
by them: User Agreements can assert additional legal rights for content 
owners only to the extent that reasonable users understand these additional 
 
 
 150. See Leff, supra note 124. 
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legal rights have been asserted. A reasonable digital consumer legally 
generates a fictional “hub” of common understanding of the parties. 
FIGURE C: CONSENT WITH THE REASONABLE DIGITAL CONSUMER 
STANDARD 
 
2. Allowing for Evolution in Consumer Understanding of Digital 
Consent 
The average levels of technology skills change over time within 
individuals and across cohorts. As different cohorts of users reach 
contractual capacity, the level of technology skills held by a reasonable 
digital consumer will also evolve. Adopting a contractual standard of 
consent predicated on empirical testing of real consumers at a particular 
point in time ensures that contractual notions of reasonable consumer 
behavior are closely aligned with the social realities of consumer 
technological proficiency.151  
 
 
 151. This evolution will result in a need to update usability test legal agreements on a regular 
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3. Facilitating Greater Predictability in Legal Outcomes to Assist in 
Enterprise Risk Management Planning 
The most effective method of mitigating corporate legal risks is a 
proactive approach creating a process of regular, legal strategic planning.  
Its goal is to accurately assess legal risks associated with corporate 
information assets and generate legal feedback loops to mitigate these 
risks in both the present and future. Therefore, it is likely that many large 
companies would be willing to usability test their legal documents in 
advance of litigation; the business certainty these tests would provide 
facilitates more effective enterprise risk management.  
In essence, a usability testing option for technology-mediated contracts 
translates legal uncertainty into a business risk calculus that companies 
will be able to understand more clearly than the current legal landscape. 
To increase the likelihood of enforceability for their agreements, 
businesses can choose to usability test them in advance of litigation to 
mitigate legal risk and re-test them when terms are changed. Conversely, if 
a business wishes to accept the legal risk of entering litigation with a non-
usability tested User Agreement, they are accepting a certain quantifiable 
risk—the loss of all protections in the agreement apart from these 
intellectual property rights they hold by law. They also will have time-
shifted the costs associated with usability testing the contract to the time of 
the litigation.  
4. Protecting Consumers from Security Risks Without Infantilizing 
Them 
Due to the severity of widespread data vulnerability in the United 
States, teaching users and technologists to protect themselves through 
legal means is increasingly critical. Currently, many users, even 
sophisticated users, click “yes” to every box that appears on their screen 
and download potentially harmful code without reading the accompanying 
legal agreements or understanding the technological and legal 
ramifications of their actions. Simultaneous legal and technological user 
education is necessary to mitigating the epidemics of phishing, 
malspam,152 zombie drones, and identity theft. Law and technology must 
 
 
basis. As terms and consumer understanding changes, the reasonable digital consumer may understand 
a particular agreement differently. 
 152. Malspam is spam that exploits security vulnerabilities on a user’s PC. See Matwyshyn, supra 
note 1.  
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evolve together and push users to help solve their own security problems. 
In this way, users’ trust in technology, particularly in the internet as a 
commercial medium, will not be further diminished despite the prevalent 
and serious security concerns that accompany its use.  
Many technologists would turn every PC into a user-proof black box 
and remove users from the security equation as much as possible. Our 
current legal regime of technology-mediated contracts, in essence, does 
the legal equivalent—reasonable users are unlikely to be capable of 
understanding most User Agreements at present, assuming the users even 
notice that the agreements exist and govern their conduct. Even if users 
struggled through a User Agreement allowing security-invasive DRM as 
currently drafted, users’ ability to understand possible consequences of 
their consent is limited by their own technological knowledge and 
experience. At this point in the technological development of our society, 
users need help in defending themselves from overly aggressive code.153 If 
average users can understand neither code nor the User Agreements 
associated with code, their ability to make informed decisions is severely 
impaired. 
5. Correcting for Varying Levels of Judges’ Technology Knowledge 
This empirically constructed reasonable consumer standard, in essence, 
leverages tools already used by courts and intellectual property owners. 
Adopting an empirically generated reasonable digital consumer standard 
would simplify the lives of judges and smooth out the practical effects of 
variations of technological knowledge from judge to judge.154 The 
reasonable digital consumer standard eliminates the need for a judge to 
walk through the particular website or application at issue and only 
requires a judge to determine the credibility of the usability studies entered 
into evidence. A complicated question of digital consent is thereby 
 
 
 153. For example, the Sony User Agreement includes a provision which is likely to be the 
provision Sony would allege authorizes the installation of the rootkit, which describes the rootkit as “a 
small proprietary software program.” See supra note 148. It is unlikely that a user, even if the user 
knew what a rootkit was, would interpret this provision to allow for installation of a rootkit and its 
attendant security risks. 
 154. These variations in knowledge are discussed in the contract literature as influencing 
outcomes, particularly in the absence of clear instructions from the parties in the contract regarding 
how they wish the dispute to be resolved. See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under 
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000) (assuming that “parties lack 
the clairvoyance needed to give courts the proper guidance if a dispute arises, and courts lack the 
genius that would be needed to enforce contracts properly in the absence of such guidance”). 
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transformed into a typical “battle of experts” scenario, which courts face in 
numerous other non-technological legal contexts. 
Similarly, trademark case law has well-established methods for 
determining whether a “reasonable” consumer is confused by a particular 
trademark or practice; these cases employ empirical testing by experts 
using real consumers. Little new methodology would need to be generated 
by courts to incorporate a consent construction based on a reasonable 
digital consumer.  
6. Leveraging the Natural Structure of the System—The Scale-Free 
Nature of Objective Consent and Form Transmission Patterns of 
Lawyers 
Our social system is a complex system. Complex systems are 
characterized by a large number of similar but independent actors who 
persistently move, respond, and evolve in relation to each other in an 
increasingly sophisticated manner.155 The result of this evolution is a form 
 
 
 155. For various applications of complex systems theory to other legal contexts see, e.g., David G. 
Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of 
Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998) (arguing that 
legal theory would be enriched by paying attention to algorithms derived from the study of complex 
systems in contexts such as competitive federalism and the “patching” algorithm). See also, e.g., Erica 
Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a 
Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003); Brenner, supra note 76; Jim Chen, Webs of 
Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); 
Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 (2003); 
Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Gerald 
Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and 
Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996); Daniel A. Farber, 
Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 145 (2003); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, 
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1998); Scott 
H. Hughes, Understanding Conflict in a Postmodern World, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); Jeff L. 
Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty,” 57 
MD. L. REV. 380 (1998); Patricia A. Martin, Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the 
Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316 (1999); Thomas R. 
McClean, Application of Administrative Law to Health Care Reform: The Real Politik of Crossing the 
Quality Chasm, 16 J.L. & HEALTH 65 (2001–2002); Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory 
Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REV. 409 (2000); J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative 
State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
161 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law 
and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); James 
Salzman, J.B. Ruhl & Kai-Sheng Song, Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253 (2002); Daniel 
S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies 
Undermine the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 463 (2002). 
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of self-organization in which order in the system forms spontaneously and 
local rules govern the conduct of each actor. Numerous independent 
actors, acting in clustered groups,156 frequently follow local rules157 and 
demonstrate increasingly complicated visible patterns of natural 
organizational behaviors and norms. Legal behaviors can follow this 
pattern.158  
One type of network structure that exists in complex systems is a scale-
free network structure.159 Scale-free networks consist of different points or 
“nodes” in the network, which evidence drastically different levels of 
connectivity—some nodes are connected to a very large number of other 
nodes and some nodes are connected to only a few others.160 In a scale-
free network, no typical node exists and the network is composed of a 
continuous hierarchy of nodes with a few “hubs”161 and numerous small 
nodes.162 
I postulate that both the naturally occurring structure of a legal regime 
of objective consent—either the one that we currently have or one driven 
by the proposed reasonable digital consumer standard—in essence 
generates a scale-free network distribution of first, the meaning of consent, 
and second, the spread of legal “forms” through our economy due to 
document sharing behaviors of transactional lawyers.  
a. A Reasonable Digital Consumer Standard Generates an 
Objective “Hub” of Shared Understanding for Both Contract 
Procedure and Substance 
An objective construction of consent aims to find external evidence 
that courts and businesses can rely on across contractual instances. 
 
 
 156. See ALBERTO LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED 49 (2002). 
 157. For example, outside of User Agreements, online communities often have additional 
community rules of conduct. See, e.g., AOL Instant Messenger Web Chat Rules & Etiquette, 
http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html (last visited May 3, 2004). 
 158. The behavior of complex adaptive systems frequently cannot be accurately predicted and can 
naturally evolve to a state of self-organization on the border between order and disorder. See GARNETT 
P. WILLIAMS, CHAOS THEORY TAMED 234 (1997). 
 159. BARABASI, supra note 156, at 55–72. By contrast, in random networks, at the peak of the 
distribution, one assumes that a majority of nodes reflect the same number of links and nodes, and thus 
a significant difference in the number of links represents an aberration. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Hubs are nodes with an unusual, disproportionately large number of other nodes connected to 
them. Id. For example, Google is, as of this writing, a hub. See Google, http://www.google.com (last 
visited May 2, 2006). 
 162. Erdos and Renyi’s random network theory, as extended by Watts and Strogatz, asserted that 
the number of nodes with a particular number of links decreases on an exponential basis, which is a 
rate of decay that is swifter than the rate predicted by a power law. BARABASI, supra note 156, at 56. 
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Therefore, the broader goal of an objectively based regime of consent is to 
generate “hubs” of shared understanding of what behaviors equate to 
contractual consent. The reasonable digital consumer is a legal generation 
of hubs of shared understanding eliminating the power imbalance between 
content providers and consumers. Currently, the hubs of (allegedly) shared 
understanding have been constructed by courts, on the one hand using 
self-referential bases, i.e., whatever the judge thinks, and on the other hand 
by enforcing the understandings of companies drafting the User 
Agreements.  
These dynamics have resulted in what is known as a “rich get richer” 
phenomenon.163 As I have empirically demonstrated in other work,164 User 
Agreements have become progressively more draconian in their terms 
over time because their authors generated their content, crafting the hubs 
of understanding through use of form agreements. This behavior evidences 
a self-reinforcing mechanism of preferential attachment165 driven by using 
the most draconian forms available, meaning that drafters tend to gravitate 
toward the most restrictive language. Meanwhile, the content of User 
Agreements has frequently been enforced by courts. Courts have been 
focusing their attention solely on generating procedural hubs of shared 
digital behavior to determine if contractual consent has occurred, and have 
ignored concerns over content. These two concerns should be taken 
together to generate a legal hub of common understanding.  
Courts have rarely seen a workable alternative option to rampant use of 
unilaterally generated form agreements in digital contracting contexts. 
Generating a reasonable digital consumer standard for consent may offer 
just such an alternative. This new standard creates hubs of understanding, 
with the critical difference being that the hubs are centered around genuine 
understandings, both procedural and substantive, of actual consumers. A 
reasonable digital consumer standard does not use a hypothetical 
consumer postulated by a particular court, nor does it give undue 
deference to the one-sided User Agreement forms many companies will 
continue to use if left unchecked.  
 
 
 163. See, e.g., Koen Frenken, Technological Innovation and Complexity Theory, 15 ECON. OF 
INNOVATION AND NEW TECH. 137 (2006). 
 164. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Development of Relational 
Internet and Privacy Contracting Norms, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE (Margret 
Radin et al. eds., 2008) (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 165. For a discussion of preferential attachment, see BARABASI, supra note 156, at 86–89. 
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b. A Reasonable Digital Consumer Standard Leverages Lawyers’ 
“Form Sharing” Behaviors and Would Quickly Spread 
Pragmatically, a reasonable digital consumer standard, as embodied by 
the usability tested forms that reflect it, would slowly permeate the system 
because of another scale-free network—the scale-free network of form 
sharing among transactional lawyers.  Transactional attorneys often 
“borrow” forms from each other and use each others’ cumulative 
experience. Particularly in the context of User Agreements that are 
available online, a transactional attorney will frequently review other 
attorneys’ work as a point of reference before drafting his own User 
Agreements. Consequently, what develops over time is a network structure 
with “hubs” of agreements and provisions that look essentially alike. 
Norms of language and document structure develop that are then 
reinforced by further sharing and court enforcement. Transactional 
attorneys seek to use norms to their advantage rather than to go against 
them when drafting. Consequently, even if only a few influential 
companies that use digital contracts shift to agreements that reflect 
usability tested standards, they will be able to instigate the emergence of a 
new norm in the system over time through lawyers’ drafting behaviors. 
The other “node” companies will follow the lead of the influential “hub” 
companies. 
In this way, the reasonable digital consumer standard leverages the 
naturally occurring structures of our social system but gently nudges them 
toward more optimal emergence; it helps guide development of these 
structures of regulation in a manner that reconciles the noise currently 
surrounding the construct of digital consent in our system.  
CONCLUSION 
In its preceding pages, this Article has set forth doctrinal tensions that 
exist in the meaning of “consent” in technology contracting. It has argued 
that the policy and legal challenges causing systemic noise in meanings of 
consent among three bodies of law require reconciliation through a new 
contracting construct for objective consent. The arrival of security-
invasive DRM illustrates the necessity of clarifying the meaning of 
consent in digital contracting case law. 
One possible avenue for building this new consent construct may be 
the generation of a “reasonable digital consumer.” A “reasonable digital 
consumer” standard can be generated through external empirical means 
modeled on the manner in which consumer confusion is determined in 
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trademark case law. This proposal leverages the naturally occurring 
structures in our complex social system to minimize the noise that 
currently surrounds doctrinal construction of consent.  
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss3/2
